π Lecture 30 β Oligopoly Models
π Overview: This lecture explores advanced oligopoly models beyond symmetric Cournot competition, focusing on strategic interactions between firms of unequal market power. It covers the Stackelberg leader-follower model, price leadership, the kinked demand curve explaining price rigidity, and the economics of cartels and collusion. Understanding these models is crucial for analyzing real-world industries where dominant firms set prices and output.
ποΈ Topics Covered
The lecture begins with the Stackelberg model of first-mover advantage, demonstrating how a leading firm anticipates and exploits the follower's reaction curve to secure higher profits. It then examines price leadership by a dominant firm, followed by the Sweezy kinked demand curve model that explains price rigidity in oligopolies. The lecture concludes with an analysis of cartels and collusion, including both centralized and market-sharing arrangements, their profit-maximization strategies, and the incentives for cheating.
π Lecture Summary
Stackelberg Oligopoly
The Stackelberg model, developed by German economist H. Von Stackelberg in 1934, postulates a first-mover advantage for the oligopoly firm that initiates the process of determining market output. Unlike symmetric Cournot models, Stackelberg recognizes that firms differ from one another. The basic features include: firms produce differentiated or homogeneous products; there are few firms serving many consumers; a single firm (the leader) chooses an output before all other firms choose their output; the leader commits to an output before all other firms; all other firms (the followers) take as given the output of the leader and choose outputs that maximize profits given the leader's output; and barriers to entry exist.
To illustrate Stackelberg first-mover advantages, we reconsider the Cournot model but now assume that firm A, as a leading firm, correctly anticipates the output-reaction of firm B, the following firm. With prior knowledge of firm B's output-reaction curve, QB = 750 - 0.5QA, firm A's total revenue curve becomes: P = 1600 - Q, where Q = QA + QB. Further, assume MCA = MCB = $100 and average cost (AC) and marginal cost (MC): AC = MC = $100.
Firm A's Total Revenue is: TRA = (1600 - Q) QA = [1600 - (QA + QB)] QA = 1600QA - QAΒ² - QAQB. Substituting Firm B's output-reaction curve, QB = 750 - 0.5QA: TRA = 1600QA - QAΒ² - QA(750 - 0.5QA) = 850QA β 0.5QAΒ². Marginal revenue for firm A is: MRA = 850 - QA. Setting MRA = MCA: 850 - QA = 100, so QA = 750 units.
After firm A determined its output level, the amount produced by firm B is calculated from Firm B's output-reaction curve: QB = 750 - 0.5QA = 750 β 0.5(750) = 375 units. Stackelberg market Equilibrium level of output is: Q = QA + QB = 750 + 375 = 1,125 units. Stackelberg market Equilibrium Price is: P = 1600 β Q = 1600 β 1,125 = $475. Profits: ΟA = $356,250 and ΟB = $178,125. For comparison, Cournot output = 1000 units and Cournot price = $600.
We might notice that market output is greater in Stackelberg equilibrium than in Cournot equilibrium because the first mover, firm A, produces more output while the follower, firm B, produces less output. Stackelberg equilibrium also results in a lower market price than that observed in Cournot equilibrium.
π Definition β First-mover advantage: The benefit gained by the firm that initiates the process of determining market output in a Stackelberg oligopoly, allowing it to produce more output and earn higher profits than the follower. π Formula: QB = 750 - 0.5QA β Firm B's output-reaction curve: Firm B's optimal output is a function of Firm A's output, decreasing by 0.5 units for each additional unit produced by Firm A. π Example: Given MCA = MCB = $100, P = 1600 - Q, and QB = 750 - 0.5QA: The leader (Firm A) produces 750 units, the follower produces 375 units, market price is $475, and profits are $356,250 for the leader and $178,125 for the follower. This compares favorably for the leader versus Cournot equilibrium (1000 units total, price = $600).
Price Leader (Barometric Firm)
Price leadership occurs when one firm establishes itself as the industry leader and other firms follow its pricing policy. This leadership may result from the size and strength of the leading firm, from cost-efficiency, or as a result of the ability of the leader to establish prices that produce satisfactory profits throughout the industry. The leader faces a price/output problem similar to monopoly; other firms are price takers and face a competitive price/output problem.
The leader is the largest, dominant, or lowest cost firm in the industry. Its demand curve is defined as the market demand curve less supply by the followers. Followers take market price as given and behave as perfect competitors. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the total market demand curve is DT, the marginal cost curve of the leader is MCL, and the horizontal summation of all of the follower firms is labeled MCf. The demand curve for the leader is: DL = DT β MCf where MCf = Sf found by setting P = MCf because DT and Sf are functions of price, DL is also a function of price.
π Definition β Price leader (barometric firm): The dominant or lowest-cost firm in an oligopoly that establishes prices that other firms follow, facing a price/output problem similar to a monopolist. π Formula: DL = DT β MCf β The leader's demand equals total market demand minus the supply from follower firms (where followers behave as perfect competitors). π‘ Why this matters: This model explains how prices are set in industries with a clear dominant firm, such as airlines or steel, without explicit collusion.
Kinked Demand Curve Model (Sweezy Oligopoly)
The Kinked demand curve model was proposed by Paul Sweezy in 1939. This model basically explains price rigidity. The basic features include: few firms in the market serving many consumers; firms produce differentiated products; barriers to entry; each firm believes rivals will match (or follow) price reductions, but won't match (or follow) price increases.
If an oligopolist raises price, other firms will not follow, so demand will be elastic. If an oligopolist lowers price, other firms will follow, so demand will be inelastic. The implication is that the demand curve will be kinked, MR will have a discontinuity, and the oligopolist will not change price when marginal cost changes.
According to Sweezy, an oligopolist faces a demand curve that has a kink at the prevailing price and is highly elastic for price increases but much less elastic for price cuts. In this model, oligopolists recognize their interdependence but act without collusion in keeping their prices constant, even in the face of changed cost and demand conditionsβpreferring instead to compete on the basis of quality, advertising, service, and other forms of non-price competition.
As in other forms of market organization, the firm under oligopoly can earn profits, break even, or incur losses in the short run, and it will continue to produce as long as P > AVC. From Figure 2 we can also see that the oligopolist's marginal cost curve can rise or fall anywhere within the discontinuous portion of the MR curve (i.e., from MC' to MC") without inducing the oligopolist to change the prevailing price of $6 and sales of 40 units (as long as P > AVC). Only if the MC curve shifts above the MC' curve will the oligopolist be induced to increase its price and reduce quantity, or only if the MC curve shifts below MC" will the oligopolist lower price and increase quantity. With a rightward or a leftward shift in the demand curve, sales will increase or fall, respectively, but the oligopolist will keep the price constant as long as the kink on the demand curve remains at the same price and the MC curve continues to intersect the discontinuous or vertical portion of the MR curve.
SWEEZY OLIGOPOLY: A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE The demand functions for price increases and price decreases are: QA = 280 - 40PA or PA = 7 β 0.025QA (for price increases) QB = 100 - 10PB or PB = 10 β 0.1QB (for price decreases) TC = 2Q + 0.25QΒ² and MC = 2 + 0.05Q
TRA = PA Γ QA = (7 β 0.025QA)QA TRB = PB Γ QB = (10 β 0.1QB)QB MRA = 7 β 0.05QA and MRB = 10 β 0.02QB
To find the kink in the demand curve, we set QA = QB = Q, since the two demand functions are: PA = 7 β 0.025Q and PB = 10 β 0.1Q PA = PB and solving for Q: 7 β 0.025Q = 10 β 0.1Q Q = 40 and P = 7 β 0.025(40) = $6
The upper and lower limit of the MR gap is: MRA = 7 β 0.05(40) = 7 β 2 = 5 MRB = 10 β 0.02(40) = 10 β 0.8 = 2
Since MC = 2 + 0.05(40) = 4, the MC curve intersects the vertical portion of the MR curve (between 2 and 5). The total profit (Ο) of the firm is: Ο = TR β TC = PQ β 2Q β 0.025QΒ² = 6(40) β 2(40) β 0.025(40)Β² = $120
π Definition β Price rigidity: The tendency of oligopolistic firms to keep prices constant despite changes in costs or demand conditions, explained by the kinked demand curve model. π Formula: MRA = 7 β 0.05Q and MRB = 10 β 0.02Q β The marginal revenue for price increases (upper segment) and price decreases (lower segment) differ, creating a vertical gap in the MR curve between Q = 40. π Example: For the Sweezy oligopolist with demand kink at Q=40, P=$6: MRA = 5, MRB = 2, MC = 4. Since MC = 4 falls within the MR gap (2 to 5), any MC changes between 2 and 5 will not induce a price change. The firm earns $120 profit.
Cartels and Collusions
In the kinked demand curve model, oligopolists did not collude to restrict or eliminate competition in order to increase profits. Collusion can be overt or explicit, as in centralized and market sharing cartels, or tacit or implicit, as in price leadership models. There are two types of cartels: the centralized cartels and market sharing cartels. Centralized cartels directly (although secretly) reach agreements among competitors to reduce the uncertainty arising from their mutual interdependence.
All firms in an oligopoly market benefit if they get together and set prices to maximize industry profits. A group of competitors operating under such a formal overt (explicit) agreement is called a cartel. If an informal covert or explicit agreement is reached, the firms are said to be operating in collusion. Both practices are illegal in various countries. However, cartels are legal in some parts of the world. Several important domestic markets are also dominated by producer associations that operate like cartels and appear to flourish without interference from the government. Agricultural commodities such as milk are prime examples of products marketed under cartel-like arrangements.
A cartel that has absolute control over all firms in an industry can operate as a monopoly. To illustrate, consider the situation shown in Figure 3. The marginal cost curves of each firm are summed horizontally to arrive at an industry marginal cost curve. Equating the cartel's total marginal cost with the industry marginal revenue curve determines the profit-maximizing output and the price, P*, to be charged. Once this profit-maximizing price/output level has been determined, each individual firm finds its optimal output by equating its own marginal cost curve to the previously determined profit-maximizing marginal cost level for the industry.
Profits are often divided among firms on the basis of their individual level of production, but other allocation techniques can be employed. Market share, production capacity, and a bargained solution based on economic power have all been used in the past. For a number of reasons, cartels are typically rather short-lived. In addition to the long-run problems of changing products and of entry into the market by new producers, cartels are subject to disagreements among members. Although firms usually agree that maximizing joint profits is mutually beneficial, they rarely agree on the equity of various profit-allocation schemes. This problem can lead to attempts to subvert the cartel agreement.
Cartel subversion can be extremely profitable. Consider a two-firm cartel in which each member serves 50 percent of the market. Cheating by either firm is very difficult, because any loss in profits or market share is readily detected.
π Definition β Cartel: A group of competitors operating under a formal overt (explicit) agreement to set prices and output to maximize joint industry profits, effectively operating as a monopoly. π Definition β Cartel subversion: The practice of secretly violating a cartel agreement (e.g., by undercutting the agreed price) to gain individual profits, which can be extremely profitable but is difficult in small, easily-monitored groups. π‘ Why this matters: Cartels are inherently unstable due to incentives for individual members to cheat, explaining why most cartels are short-lived despite the potential for monopoly profits.
β Key Takeaways
The Stackelberg model demonstrates that being the first mover in an oligopoly allows a firm to secure higher profits by anticipating the follower's reactionβin the numerical example, the leader earned $356,250 while the follower earned only $178,125. The kinked demand curve model explains price rigidity in oligopolies, showing that marginal cost can fluctuate within the discontinuous MR gap without inducing price changes, as demonstrated where MC could vary between $2 and $5 while price remained at $6 for sales of 40 units. Price leadership by a dominant firm represents a form of tacit collusion where the leader acts as a monopolist facing residual demand (DL = DT β MCf), while followers behave as perfect competitors. Cartels attempt to maximize joint monopoly profits by equating industry MR with the sum of member firms' MC curves, but are inherently unstable due to incentives for cheatingβa key reason why overt collusion is illegal in most countries. The comparison between Stackelberg and Cournot outcomes reveals that the first-mover advantage leads to higher total market output (1,125 vs. 1,000 units) and lower price ($475 vs. $600).
π§ Quick Revision Questions
- In the Stackelberg numerical example, what is the leader's output, follower's output, market price, and each firm's profit? How does this compare to Cournot equilibrium?
- How is the leader's demand curve derived in the price leadership model, and what is the behavioral assumption about follower firms?
- Why does the kinked demand curve lead to price rigidity? What condition must be met for the price to remain unchanged when costs change?
- In the Sweezy numerical example, calculate the kink point (Q and P), the upper and lower limits of the MR gap, and verify that MC falls within this gap. What would happen if MC shifted above the upper limit?
- What are the two types of cartels and why are cartels typically short-lived despite the potential for monopoly profits?
π Lecture 31 β Oligopoly: Game Theoretic Approach
π Overview: This lecture introduces game theory as a powerful analytical tool for understanding strategic interaction among oligopolistic firms. It covers the fundamental elements of game theory, explains the famous Prisoner's Dilemma, and demonstrates how Nash equilibrium concepts apply to pricing, advertising, and cartel behavior in oligopoly markets.
ποΈ Topics Covered
The lecture begins by defining oligopoly and explaining why game theory is essential for analyzing strategic interdependence among firms. It then covers game theory basics including types of games, elements of game theory models, and strategic behavior. The Prisoner's Dilemma is presented as a classic example demonstrating why rational players may not cooperate. The lecture concludes with detailed analysis of Nash equilibrium, dominant strategies, and applications to price competition, non-price competition, and cartel cheating.
π Lecture Summary
Oligopoly: Game Theoretic Approach
When just a few large firms dominate a market, each firm recognizes its strategic interdependence with others. An oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of strategically interdependent firms. Economists have developed several models including collusive models, limit-pricing models, managerial models, and behavioral models, but none provides a complete general theory of oligopoly decision-making.
Game Theory
Game theory is concerned with the choice of the best or optimal strategy in conflict situations. While John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern did pioneering work in the late 1940s, the analytical breakthrough was made by John Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten (Nobel Prize 1994). Nash introduced the distinction between cooperative games (where binding agreements can be made) and non-cooperative games (where binding agreements are not feasible). He developed the Nash equilibrium concept for predicting outcomes of non-cooperative games.
Game Theory Basics
Types of Games
- Zero-sum game: offsetting gains/losses
- Positive sum game: potential for mutual gain
- Negative-sum game: potential for mutual loss
- Cooperative games: joint action is favored
- Non-Cooperative Games: binding agreements not feasible
Role of Interdependence
- Sequential games involve successive moves
- Simultaneous-move games incorporate coincident moves
π Definition β Game theory approach: An approach to modeling strategic interaction of oligopolists in terms of moves and countermoves.
Game Theory: Elements
A strategy is a specific course of action with clearly defined values for policy variables. A strategy is dominant if it is optimal regardless of what the other player does. The payoff of a strategy is the "net gain" it will bring to the firm for any given counter-strategy of the rival firm. A payoff matrix is the table giving the payoffs from all strategies open to the firm and the rivals' responses. Policy variables include price, quantity, quality, advertising, R&D expenditure, and changes in the number of products. Players are the decision-makers (managers of oligopolist firms) whose actions are interdependent and not entirely predictable.
Strategic behavior refers to the plan of action of an oligopolist after considering all possible reactions of its competitors as they compete for profits. Since only a few firms exist, each firm's actions affect others, and reactions must be considered when charting the best course of action.
In a simultaneous-move game, each decision maker makes choices without specific knowledge of competitor counter moves. In a sequential-move game, decision makers move after observing competitor moves. In a one-shot game, interaction occurs only once; in a repeat game, there is ongoing interaction between competitors.
π‘ Why this matters: The classification of games helps managers understand their competitive environment and choose appropriate strategies based on whether interactions are one-time or repeated, simultaneous or sequential.
Prisoners' Dilemma
The prisoner's dilemma is a fundamental problem in game theory that demonstrates why two people might not cooperate even if it is in both their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher at RAND in 1950. Albert W. Tucker formalized the game with prison sentence payoffs.
Classic Example: Two suspects are arrested. Police offer each the same deal:
- If one testifies (defects) and the other remains silent (cooperates): defector goes free, silent partner gets 10 years
- If both remain silent: both get 1 year
- If both betray: each gets 5 years
Table 1: Payoff Matrix
| Individual A β / Individual B β | Confess | Don't Confess |
|---|---|---|
| Confess | (5, 5) | (0, 10) |
| Don't Confess | (10, 0) | (1, 1) |
Table 2: Dominant Strategy - Both Confess (Nash Equilibrium)
| Individual A β / Individual B β | Confess | Don't Confess |
|---|---|---|
| Confess | (5, 5) | (0, 10) |
| Don't Confess | (10, 0) | (1, 1) |
For suspect A: If B confesses, A gets 5 years confessing vs 10 years not confessing. If B doesn't confess, A goes free confessing vs 1 year not confessing. Confessing is the dominant strategy for A. Similarly, confessing is dominant for B. The unique equilibrium is Pareto sub-optimalβrational choice leads both to defect even though both would be better off cooperating.
π Definition β Prisoners' dilemma: A situation where each firm adopts its dominant strategy but each could earn larger profits by cooperating. Each firm cannot trust its rival to cooperate.
Price Competition and the Prisoners' Dilemma
Table 3: Application - Price Competition (Dominant Strategy: Low Price)
| Firm A β / Firm B β | Low Price | High Price |
|---|---|---|
| Low Price | (2, 2) | (5, 1) |
| High Price | (1, 5) | (3, 3) |
If firm B charges low price ($6), firm A earns 2 at low price and 1 at high price ($8). If firm B charges high price, firm A earns 5 at low price and 3 at high price. Both firms adopt dominant strategy of charging low price and earn 2, but both could earn 3 if they cooperated and charged high price.
Non-Price Competition, Cartel Cheating, and the Prisoners' Dilemma
By changing the headings of the same payoff matrix, we can analyze different scenarios:
Table 4: Nonprice Competition (Dominant Strategy: Advertise)
| Firm A β / Firm B β | Advertise | Don't Advertise |
|---|---|---|
| Advertise | (2, 2) | (5, 1) |
| Don't Advertise | (1, 5) | (3, 3) |
Each firm adopts dominant strategy of advertising and earns 2, but both would earn 3 by not advertising.
Table 5: Cartel Cheating (Dominant Strategy: Cheat)
| Firm A β / Firm B β | Cheat | Don't Cheat |
|---|---|---|
| Cheat | (2, 2) | (5, 1) |
| Don't Cheat | (1, 5) | (3, 3) |
Each firm adopts dominant strategy of cheating and earns 2, but both would earn 3 by not cheating.
Nash Equilibrium: Dominant Strategy
Table 6: Payoff Matrix - Advertising Game
| Firm A β / Firm B β | Advertise | Don't Advertise |
|---|---|---|
| Advertise | (4, 3) | (5, 1) |
| Don't Advertise | (2, 5) | (3, 2) |
Table 7-9: Firm A's Decision If firm B advertises: A earns 4 advertising vs 2 not advertising β advertise If firm B doesn't advertise: A earns 5 advertising vs 3 not advertising β advertise Dominant strategy for Firm A: Advertise
Table 8-10: Firm B's Decision If firm A advertises: B earns 3 advertising vs 1 not advertising β advertise If firm A doesn't advertise: B earns 5 advertising vs 2 not advertising β advertise Dominant strategy for Firm B: Advertise
Nash equilibrium: Both firms advertise (top left cell: 4, 3)
Nash Equilibrium without Dominant Strategy
Table 12: Modified Payoff Matrix
| Firm A β / Firm B β | Advertise | Don't Advertise |
|---|---|---|
| Advertise | (4, 3) | (5, 1) |
| Don't Advertise | (2, 5) | (6, 2) |
Now firm B has a dominant strategy, but firm A does not.
Table 13-14: Firm A's Decision If firm B advertises: A earns 4 advertising vs 2 not advertising β advertise If firm B doesn't advertise: A earns 5 advertising vs 6 not advertising β don't advertise Firm A has no dominant strategy - optimal choice depends on what B does.
Table 15-17: Firm B's Decision If firm A advertises: B earns 3 advertising vs 1 not advertising β advertise If firm A doesn't advertise: B earns 5 advertising vs 2 not advertising β advertise Dominant strategy for Firm B: Advertise
Table 18-19: Nash Equilibrium Since firm B will choose to advertise (dominant strategy), firm A's best response is to advertise (earning 4 vs 2). The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to advertise at cell (4, 3).
π Definition β Nash equilibrium: A situation where each player chooses his or her optimal strategy, given the strategy chosen by the other player. No player has an incentive to change their strategy unilaterally.
π Key formula: Nash Equilibrium β When each player's strategy is the best response to the other player's strategy, and neither can improve their payoff by changing alone.
π Example: In Table 19, given firm B advertises (dominant strategy), firm A's best response is to advertise (4 > 2). At (Advertise, Advertise) with payoffs (4, 3), neither firm can improve by changing strategy alone.
β Key Takeaways
The prisoner's dilemma demonstrates that rational self-interested behavior can lead to suboptimal outcomes for all players, explaining why oligopolistic firms often engage in price wars, excessive advertising, or cartel cheating even when cooperation would yield higher profits. A dominant strategy exists when a player's optimal choice is the same regardless of what the opponent does, while a Nash equilibrium occurs when each player's strategy is the best response to the other's strategy. The same payoff matrix structure can be applied to analyze price competition, non-price competition (advertising), and cartel cheating by simply changing the strategy labels. Understanding these game theory concepts is essential for managers to anticipate competitor reactions and develop optimal competitive strategies in oligopolistic markets.
π§ Quick Revision Questions
- What is the prisoner's dilemma and why does it lead to a Pareto sub-optimal outcome?
- Explain the difference between a dominant strategy and a Nash equilibrium.
- Using the payoff matrix in Table 3, show why both firms end up charging a low price even though they would both prefer the high-price outcome.
- What conditions must be present for a game to have a Nash equilibrium without either player having a dominant strategy?
- How can the same payoff matrix structure be applied to analyze price competition, advertising decisions, and cartel cheating?
π Lecture 32 β Oligopoly: Game Theoretic Approach (Continued)
π Overview: This lecture continues the exploration of game theory applications in oligopolistic markets, focusing on different types of repeated games and strategic interactions between firms. It examines how the timing of decisions (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the duration of interactions (finite vs. infinite) affect competitive outcomes, cooperation possibilities, and the credibility of strategic threats.
ποΈ Topics Covered
The lecture covers games in economics including repeated games (finitely and infinitely repeated), simultaneous and sequential games, the Prisoner's Dilemma and its business applications, Nash equilibrium in cooperative and non-cooperative games, Nash bargaining, trigger strategies in finitely repeated games, tit-for-tat strategy, threat credibility and commitment, and entry deterrence strategies using payoff matrices.
π Lecture Summary
Games in Economics
Games in economics are classified based on timing and duration. Repeated games are played repeatedly over a period of time. Finitely repeated games include games that take place over a fixed or uncertain period of time. Infinitely repeated games occur over and over again without boundary or limit. However, if the number of periods is fixed, players will have incentive to 'cheat' in the last period due to lack of threat of retaliation, which then allows them to cheat in all periods.
Simultaneous games are games in which players make their strategy choices at the same time, without specific knowledge of competitor countermoves. Sequential games are games in which players make their decisions sequentially, after observing competitor moves. In sequential games, the first mover may have an advantage. If two firms set prices without knowledge of each other's decisions, it is a simultaneous-move game. If one firm sets its price only after observing its rival's price, the firm is said to be involved in a sequential-move game. In a one-shot game, the underlying interaction between competitors occurs only once; in a repeat game, there is an ongoing interaction between competitors.
A game theory strategy is a decision rule that describes the action taken by a decision maker at any point in time. A simple introduction to game theory strategy is provided by the most famous of all simultaneous-move one-shot games: the Prisoner's Dilemma. The Prisoner's Dilemma game fascinates game theorists for various reasons. Oligopolistic firms often face a problem called the prisoners dilemmaβa situation in which each firm adopts its dominant strategy but each could do better (earn larger profits) by cooperating. Theory shows that when games are repeated, the chances for cooperation or collusion increase.
Nash Equilibrium: Cooperative vs Non-Cooperative Games
The "equilibrium" is where each player makes a decision representing the best outcome in response to what other players' decisions are. Nash equilibrium is a point where no player can improve their position by selecting any other available strategy while others are playing their best options and not changing their strategies.
In Table 1, each firm's secure strategy is to offer a discount price regardless of the other firm's actions. The outcome is that both firms offer discount prices and earn relatively modest profits. This outcome is a Nash equilibrium because, given the strategy of its competitor, neither firm can improve its own payoff by independently changing its own strategy. In the case of Coca-Cola, given that Pepsi-Cola has chosen a discount pricing strategy, it too would decide to offer discount prices. When Pepsi-Cola offers discount prices, Coca-Cola can earn profits of $4b rather than $2b per week by also offering a discount. Similarly, when Coca-Cola offers discount prices, Pepsi-Cola can earn maximum profits of $2b per week, versus $1b per week, by also offering a discount.
Clearly, profits are less than if they colluded and both charged regular prices. Coca-Cola would earn $6b per week and Pepsi-Cola would earn $4b per week if both charged regular prices. This is a business application of the Prisoner's Dilemma because the dual discount pricing Nash equilibrium is inferior from the firms' viewpoint to a collusive outcome where both competitors agree to charge regular prices. Of course, if firms collude and agree to charge high prices, consumers are made worse off, which is why price collusion among competitors is illegal in many countries.
A secure strategy, sometimes called the maximin strategy, guarantees the best possible outcome given the worst possible scenario. In the case of Prisoner's Dilemma, the worst possible scenario for each suspect is that the other chooses to confess. Each suspect can avoid the worst possible outcome of receiving a harsh 5 years in prison sentence only by choosing to confess. For each suspect, the secure strategy is to confess, thereby becoming a prisoner, because neither could solve the riddle posed by the Prisoner's Dilemma.
π‘ Why this matters: The Nash equilibrium concept reveals why rational individual choices can lead to collectively inferior outcomesβa fundamental insight for understanding competitive markets and the rationale behind cooperation.
Nash Bargaining
Though the Prisoner's Dilemma is posed within the scope of a bargaining problem between two suspects, it has obvious practical applications in business. Competitors like Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola confront similar bargaining problems on a regular basis. Suppose each has to decide whether to offer a special discount to a large grocery store retailer.
Table 1 shows that if neither offers discount pricing, a weekly profit of $6b will be earned by Coca-Cola and $4b per week will be earned by Pepsi-Colaβthe best possible scenario for both. However, if Coca-Cola is the only one to offer a discount, it will earn $8b per week, while Pepsi-Cola profits fall to $1b per week. If Pepsi-Cola offers a discount and Coca-Cola continues to charge the regular price, Pepsi-Cola profits will total $5b per week while Coca-Cola weekly profits fall to $2b. The only secure means Coca-Cola has for avoiding the possibility of only $2b per week profit is to grant a discount price, assuring itself of at least $4b. Similarly, the only means Pepsi-Cola has of avoiding the possibility of profits of $1b per week is to also grant a discount price, assuring itself of at least $2b in weekly profits. For both firms, the only secure strategy is to offer discount prices, assuring consumers of bargain prices and themselves of modest profits.
Repeated Games: Infinite
The study of one-shot pricing and product quality games might lead one to conclude that even tacit collusion is impossible. This is not true because competitors often interact on a continuous basis. In such circumstances, firms are said to be involved in repeat games.
When a competitive game is repeated over and over, firms receive sequential payoffs that shape current and future strategies. For example, both Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola might tacitly or secretly agree to charge regular prices so long as the other party continues to do so. If neither firm cheats on such a collusive agreement, discounts will never be offered, and maximum profits will be earned. Although there is an obvious risk involved with charging regular prices, there is also an obvious cost if either or both firms offer discount pricing. If each firm is convinced that the other will maintain regular prices, both will enjoy high profits. This resolve is increased if each firm is convinced that the other will quickly match any discount pricing strategy. In fact, it is rational for colluding firms to quickly and severely punish colluding competitors who "cheat" by lowering prices.
However, although it is important to recognize that the repeat nature of competitor interactions can sometimes harm consumers, it is equally important to recognize that repetitive interactions in the marketplace provide necessary incentives for firms to produce high-quality goods. In any one-shot game, it would pay firms with high-quality reputations to produce low-cost or inferior quality goods. Both Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola have invested millions of dollars in product development and quality control to ensure that consumers can depend upon their products. Because the value of millions of dollars spent on brand-name advertising would be lost if product quality were to deteriorate, that brand name advertising is itself a type of quality assurance provided to customers.
π‘ Why this matters: Infinite repetition changes the strategic calculusβthe fear of future retaliation can support cooperative outcomes that would be impossible in one-shot interactions.
Finitely Repeated Games
Finitely repeated games have limited duration.
A Trigger Strategy is a system of behavior that remains the same until another player takes some course of action that gives rise to a different response.
A finitely repeated game is one that occurs only a limited number of times or has limited duration. Suppose Dell and Intel have agreed to have a customer-supplier relationship strategy. At present, Dell computers are marked with the logo "Intel Inside", indicating that Intel supplies Dell with microprocessors. Assume that Dell agrees to use Intel microprocessors in its computers so long as Intel agrees not to market its own Intel brand of computers. If Intel breaks this supply agreement, it is understood that Dell will punish Intel by thereafter stop doing business with Intel. This means that Intel cheating will trigger a "do not buy" response from Dell in every future period.
So long as the supply agreement is not violated by both parties, Dell will earn $3b per year and Intel will earn $5b per year. If Intel breaks the supply agreement, Intel would earn $8b for one period while Dell would suffer a loss of $3b. However, this one-time benefit for Intel is outweighed by the loss forever of the $5b per period benefit that would have been earned from maintaining the supply agreement with Dell. Therefore, on account of trigger strategies, it can be ensured that the cost of breaking agreements exceeds any resulting benefits, where both costs and benefits are measured in present value terms.
Repeated Games and Tit-for-Tat Strategy
Cooperation is not likely to occur in prisoners' dilemma games played only once (involving a single move by each player). Cooperation is more likely to occur in repeated games, or games involving many consecutive moves by each player. These types of games are more realistic in the real worldβoligopolists do not decide on their pricing strategy only once but many times over many years.
In repeated games (involving many consecutive moves and countermoves by each player), the best strategy for each player is tit-for-tat. Tit-for-tat behavior can be summarized as follows: Do to your opponent what he has just done to you. That is, you begin by cooperating and continue to cooperate as long as your opponent cooperates. If he betrays you, the next time you betray him back. If he then cooperates, the next time you also cooperate. This strategy is retaliatory enough to discourage non-cooperation but forgiving enough to allow a pattern of mutual cooperation to develop. In computer simulations as well as actual experiments, tit-for-tat behavior was found to be consistently the best strategy (the one that resulted in the largest benefit) for each player over time.
Threat, Commitments, and Credibility
Oligopolistic firms often adopt strategies to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals even if it means temporarily reducing their own profits. For example, an oligopolist may threaten to lower its prices if its rivals lower theirs, even if this means reducing its own profits.
One way to make this threat credible is for firm A to develop a reputation for carrying out its threats even at the expense of profits. This may seem irrational. However, if firm A actually carries out its threat several times, it would earn a reputation for making credible threats, and this is likely to induce firm B to also charge a high price, thus possibly leading to higher profits for firm A in the long run. In that case, firm A would earn a profit of 5 and firm B a profit of 3 (the bottom right cell) as opposed to a profit of 3 for firm A and 4 for firm B (the bottom left cell). Even if firm B earns a profit of 3 by charging the high price (as compared with a profit of 4 by charging the low price), this is still higher than the profit of 2 that it would earn if firm A carries out the threat of charging the low price if firm B does (the top left cell). By showing a commitment to carry out its threats, firm A makes its threats credible and increases its profits over time.
Entry Deterrence
One important strategy that an oligopolist can use to deter market entry is to threaten to lower its price and thereby impose a loss on the potential entrant. Such a threat, however, works only if it is credible.
The payoff matrix of Table 3 shows that firm A's threat to lower its price is not credible and does not discourage firm B from entering the market. The reason is that firm A earns a profit of 4 if it charges the low price and a profit of 7 if it charges the high price. Unless firm A makes a credible commitment to fight entry even at the expense of profits, it would not deter firm B from entering the market. Firm A could make a credible threat by expanding its capacity before it is needed.
The payoff matrix of Table 4 is the same as in Table 3, except that firm A's profits are now lower when it charges a high price because idle or excess capacity increases firm A's costs without increasing its sales. On the other hand, charging a low price would allow firm A to increase sales and utilize its newly built capacity so that costs and revenues increase, leaving firm A's profits the same as in Table 3. Building excess capacity in anticipation of future needs now becomes a credible threat because with excess capacity firm A will charge a low price and earn a profit of 4 instead of a profit of 3 if it charged the high price. By now charging a low price, firm B would incur a loss of 2 if it entered the market, and so firm B would stay out of the market. Entry deterrence is now credible and effective.
Table 3: Entry Deterrence (Before Capacity Expansion)
| Firm A | Enter | Do Not Enter |
|---|---|---|
| Low Price | (4, -2) | (6, 0) |
| High Price | (7, 2) | (10, 0) |
Table 4: Entry Deterrence (After Capacity Expansion)
| Firm A | Enter | Do Not Enter |
|---|---|---|
| Low Price | (4, -2) | (6, 0) |
| High Price | (3, 2) | (8, 0) |
π‘ Why this matters: The credibility of threats determines whether entry deterrence strategies succeedβbuilding excess capacity can transform an empty threat into a credible commitment that actually changes competitors' behavior.
β Key Takeaways
The Prisoner's Dilemma demonstrates that individually rational strategies (dominant strategies) can lead to collectively inferior outcomes compared to cooperative solutions, explaining why oligopolistic firms often earn lower profits than they could through collusion. The Nash equilibrium occurs when no firm can improve its payoff by unilaterally changing strategy, given the competitor's strategy choice. In infinitely repeated games, the threat of future retaliation makes cooperation sustainable through trigger strategies and tit-for-tat behavior, where firms cooperate initially and mimic rivals' previous actions. The credibility of threats is essential for effective strategic behaviorβfirms must demonstrate commitment through actions like building excess capacity to make entry deterrence believable. Finally, the timing of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and the duration of interactions (one-shot vs. repeated) fundamentally determine which strategies are optimal in competitive markets.
π§ Quick Revision Questions
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What distinguishes a Nash equilibrium from other strategy combinations in a game theory payoff matrix?
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Why does the Prisoner's Dilemma result in both firms choosing discount prices even though they would both earn higher profits by charging regular prices?
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How does a trigger strategy work in a finitely repeated game between Dell and Intel, and why does it prevent Intel from cheating on their supply agreement?
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Explain the tit-for-tat strategy and why it is considered the best approach in repeated games.
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How can building excess capacity transform a non-credible entry deterrence threat into a credible one? Use the payoff matrices from Tables 3 and 4 to support your answer.