π Lecture 33 β PRICING PRACTICES
π Overview: This lecture examines price discrimination as a pricing strategy where firms charge different prices for the same product when cost differences don't justify the price differences. It explains the three necessary conditions for price discrimination and explores the three degrees of price discrimination, showing how firms can increase profits by capturing consumer surplus across different market segments.
ποΈ Topics Covered
This lecture covers the meaning and conditions of price discrimination, including the requirement that the firm must be an imperfect competitor with differing price elasticities and the ability to segment markets. It explains the three degrees of price discrimination: first-degree (charging each customer the maximum), second-degree (quantity discounts), and third-degree (different prices in different markets). The lecture includes detailed graphical illustrations and a numerical example of the XYZ University pricing problem, comparing outcomes with and without price discrimination.
π Lecture Summary
PRICE DISCRIMINATION: MEANING AND CONDITIONS
Price discrimination refers to the charging of different prices for different quantities of a product, at different times, to different customer groups or in different markets, when these price differences are not justified by cost differences. The incentive is that the firm can increase its total revenue and profits for a given level of sales and total costs by practicing price discrimination.
Relevant examples include: (1) power companies charging lower prices to residential than commercial users; (2) medical and legal professions charging lower fees to low-income people; (3) companies charging lower prices abroad than at home; (4) entertainment companies charging lower prices for afternoon than evening performances; (5) service industries charging lower prices for children and elderly; (6) hotels charging lower rates for seminars and conventions.
π‘ Why this matters: Price differences based on cost differences are NOT price discrimination. In economics, price discrimination is neutral β it benefits some and harms others, making it difficult to determine whether it is beneficial or harmful for society.
Three conditions must be met for a firm to practice price discrimination:
- Firm must be an imperfect competitor (a price maker)
- Price elasticity must differ for units sold at different prices across submarkets
- Firm must be able to segment the market and prevent resale across segments
π Definition β Price Discrimination: charging different prices for the same product when price differences are not justified by cost differences
DEGREES OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
There are three types of price discrimination. By practicing any type, the firm can increase its total revenue and profits by capturing all or part of the consumer's surplus.
- First degree price discrimination β creates different prices for each customer (maximum profits)
- Second degree price discrimination β gives quantity discounts
- Third degree price discrimination β assigns different prices by customer age, gender, income, location, etc.
Consumersβ surplus is the value of purchased goods and services above and beyond the amount paid to sellers. It arises because individual consumers place different values on goods and services. Customers with high value pay high prices; those with low value only pay low prices.
π Definition β Consumers' Surplus: the value of purchased goods and services above and beyond the amount paid to sellers
FIRST-DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION
- Each unit is sold at the highest possible price
- Firm extracts all of the consumersβ surplus
- Firm maximizes total revenue and profit from any quantity sold
π Example: A customer willing to pay Rs 1000 for one pair of shoes and Rs 750 for a second pair. A monopolist knowing this could offer one pair at Rs 1000 and a second pair for Rs 750, or make an all-or-nothing offer: two pairs for Rs 1750. Either way, the monopolist extracts almost all consumer surplus.
Unlike a simple monopolist who charges every customer the same price, the discriminating monopolist finds it profitable to supply any customer willing to pay at least marginal cost. This means output will be at the efficient level β there is no efficiency loss from underproduction, but the monopolist extracts almost all consumer surplus.
SECOND-DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION
- Charging a uniform price per unit for a specific quantity, a lower price per unit for an additional quantity, and so on
- Firm extracts part, but not all, of the consumersβ surplus
π Example: LESCO Electricity Consumer Bill (Second-Degree Price Discrimination) Total units consumed = 770
- 100 Units: Rs 4.20/unit
- 200 Units: Rs 6.34/unit
- 400 Units: Rs 10.24/unit
- Above 700 Units: Rs 12.77/unit
Figure 1, 2, 3 illustrate second-degree price discrimination graphically, showing how different price blocks capture portions of consumer surplus.
THIRD-DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION
- Charging different prices for the same product sold in different markets
- Firm maximizes profits by selling a quantity on each market such that marginal revenue on each market equals the marginal cost of production
MRβ = MRβ = MC
Price/Output Determination:
- To maximize profits, set MR = MC in each market
- Without price discrimination: MR = MC for all customers as a group
- With price discrimination: MR = MC for each customer or customer group
π‘ Why this matters: Profitable price discrimination benefits sellers at the expense of some customers
π Formula: MRβ = MRβ = MC β profit-maximizing condition for third-degree price discrimination
GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION β XYZ University Pricing Problem
Figure 4 shows demand curves for the general public (part a) and for students (part b). The aggregate demand curve (part c) represents the horizontal sum of quantities demanded at each price. The associated marginal revenue curve, MRP+S, has a similar interpretation.
For example, marginal revenue equals $25 at an attendance level of 20,000 in the public market and $25 at 40,000 in the student market. One point on the total marginal revenue curve represents output of 60,000 units and marginal revenue of $25. The single marginal cost curve MC = $25 applies to each market.
Two-part process:
- Determine profit-maximizing total output level
- Allocate this output between submarkets
Profit maximization occurs at the aggregate output level where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Figure 4(c) shows profit-maximizing output of 60,000 tickets, where MC = MR = $25. Proper allocation: draw a horizontal line at $25. The intersection with each submarket's MR curve indicates optimal distribution: 20,000 tickets to the public at $125 and 40,000 tickets to students at $75.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION EXAMPLE β XYZ University
Public Demand: Pp = 225 β 0.005Q TRp = (225 β 0.005Q)Q MRp = 225 β 0.01Qp TC = 1,500,000 + 25Q MC = 25
Solving for Public Market: MRp = MC 225 β 0.01Qp = 25 0.01Qp = 200 Qp = 20,000 Pp = 225 β 0.005(20,000) = $125
Student Demand: Ps = 125 β 0.00125Q TRs = (125 β 0.00125Q)Q MRs = 125 β 0.0025Qs MC = 25
Solving for Student Market: MRs = MC 125 β 0.0025Qs = 25 0.0025Qs = 100 Qs = 40,000 Ps = 125 β 0.00125(40,000) = $75
Total Operating Surplus (Profit): Operating Surplus = TRp + TRs β TC = $125(20,000) + $75(40,000) β 1,500,000 β $25(60,000) = $2,500,000 + $3,000,000 β $1,500,000 β $1,500,000 = $2.5 million
π Formula: Operating Surplus = TRp + TRs β TC β profit with price discrimination
π Example: Optimal price/output with discrimination: 20,000 tickets to public at $125, 40,000 tickets to students at $75, yielding $2.5 million surplus.
WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION EXAMPLE
Qp = 45,000 β 200Pp and Qs = 100,000 β 800Ps
Assuming Pp = Ps, total demand (Qt) equals: Qt = Qp + Qs = 145,000 β 1,000P P = $145 β $0.001Q MR = 145 β 0.002Q MC = 25
Solving: MR = MC 145 β 0.002Q = 25 0.002Q = 120 Q = 60,000 P = 145 β 0.001(60,000) = $85
Qp = 45,000 β 200(85) = 28,000 Qs = 100,000 β 800(85) = 32,000
Operating Surplus (Profit) = TR β TC = 85(60,000) β 1,500,000 β 25(60,000) = 5,100,000 β 1,500,000 β 1,500,000 = $2.1 million
Total tickets sold = 60,000 under both policies. Student discounts increase student attendance from 32,000 to 40,000 and maximize surplus at $2.5 million versus $2.1 million.
Winners: Students and XYZ University Losers: General public who pay higher prices or are priced out of the market
π Example: Without discrimination, price = $85 in both markets, 28,000 public and 32,000 student tickets, profit = $2.1 million β $400,000 less than with discrimination.
β Key Takeaways
The most critical concept is that price discrimination allows firms to increase profits by charging different prices to different customer groups based on their willingness to pay, without cost differences justifying the price differences. There are three degrees of price discrimination: first-degree (perfect discrimination charging each customer the maximum they'll pay), second-degree (quantity discounts), and third-degree (different prices in different markets based on elasticity differences). The profit-maximizing condition for third-degree price discrimination is that marginal revenue in each market must equal marginal cost (MRβ = MRβ = MC). The XYZ University example demonstrates that price discrimination increases profit from $2.1 million to $2.5 million compared to a single-price policy, while creating winners (students and the university) and losers (the general public who pay higher prices). Students must remember that price elasticity differences between markets are essential for profitable price discrimination, and the firm must be able to prevent resale between market segments.
π§ Quick Revision Questions
- What are the three conditions necessary for a firm to practice price discrimination?
- What is the difference between first-degree and second-degree price discrimination in terms of consumer surplus extraction?
- In third-degree price discrimination, what is the profit-maximizing condition that relates marginal revenue across markets to marginal cost?
- In the XYZ University example, how much additional profit does price discrimination generate compared to the single-price policy?
- Why must price elasticity differ across submarkets for price discrimination to be profitable?
π Lecture 34 β Pricing Practices (Continued 1)
π Overview: This lecture examines pricing strategies for multiproduct firms, focusing on demand and production interrelationships between products. It covers optimal pricing for products with interdependent demands, joint products produced in fixed and variable proportions, and plant capacity utilization, which are essential for real-world firms that typically produce multiple products rather than a single product.
ποΈ Topics Covered
The lecture covers demand interrelations between substitute and complementary products, production interrelations including by-products and joint products, optimal pricing rules for joint products in variable and fixed proportions, plant capacity utilization across multiple products, and detailed numerical examples of joint product pricing with and without excess by-products, including graphical analysis of profit-maximizing output levels.
π Lecture Summary
Demand Interrelations
Products sold by a firm may be interrelated as substitutes or complements. Demand interrelationships influence pricing decisions through their effect on marginal revenue. For a two-product firm (A and B), the marginal revenue functions are:
MRA = ΞTRA/ΞQA + ΞTRB/ΞQA MRB = ΞTRB/ΞQB + ΞTRA/ΞQB
Each marginal revenue has two components: one from the product itself, and another (the cross-marginal revenue term) reflecting demand interrelationships. The term (ΞTRB)/(ΞQA) measures the effect on revenues from product B from selling an additional unit of product A.
π Definition β Cross-marginal revenue term: The change in total revenue from one product resulting from a change in sales of another product.
For complementary products, the cross-marginal revenue term is positive because increased sales of one product stimulate sales of the other. For substitute products, the term is negative because increased sales of one reduce demand for the other. Optimal pricing requires considering both direct and cross-marginal effects; failure to do so leads to suboptimal pricing and output decisions.
Production Interrelations
A by-product is any output produced as a direct result of producing some other output. Multiple products are produced in variable proportions in many industriesβfor example, petroleum refining produces gasoline, diesel fuel, and heating oil in variable proportions. By-products are sometimes unintended results of production, such as pollution. Many agricultural products (wheat and straw, beef and hides, milk and butter) and mining products (gold and copper, silver and lead) are produced in fixed proportions.
Joint Products
Joint Products in Variable Proportions
- Treat them as distinct products
- Set MRA = MCA and MRB = MCB
- Allocation of common costs is wrong and illogical
Joint Products in Fixed Proportions
- If Q = QA = QB, set MRQ = MRA + MRB = MCQ
π Definition β Joint or Common Costs: Costs that are shared in the manufacturing and marketing of two or more products in a product line.
Joint Product Pricing Rules
Joint Products without Excess By-product
- Profit maximization requires setting MRQ = MRA + MRB = MCQ
- Marginal revenue from each by-product contributes toward covering MCQ
Joint Production with Excess By-product
- Profit maximization requires setting MRQ = MRA + MRB = MCQ
- Primary product marginal revenue covers MCQ
- Byproduct MR = MC = 0
Plant Capacity Utilization
A multi-product firm using a single plant should produce quantities where the marginal revenue (MRi) from each of its k products is equal to the marginal cost (MC) of production:
MRβ = MRβ = β― = MRk = MC
Firms produce multiple products to make fuller use of plant capacity. A firm with idle capacity can search for other products to produce as long as their marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost. Products are introduced in order of profitability until the marginal revenue of the least profitable product equals its marginal cost.
Figure 1 shows a firm selling three products (A, B, C) with respective demand curves DA, DB, DC. The firm maximizes profits when MRA = MRB = MRC = MC, shown by points EA, EB, EC where the equal marginal revenue (EMR) line crosses each MR curve. The firm produces 60 units of product A at PA = $16, 90 units of product B at PB = $15 (from 150 - 60), and 180 units of product C at PC = $14 (from 330 - 150). Each successive demand curve is more elastic, and prices decline while marginal cost rises.
Joint Products Produced in Variable Proportions
Firms can vary the proportions of joint products even in classic fixed-proportion examples like beef and hides, but only over short periods. The marginal cost of either joint product equals the increase in total costs from a one-unit increase in that product, holding the other constant. Profit maximization occurs where MRA = MCA and MRB = MCB.
π‘ Why this matters: Although separate marginal costs can be determined for variable-proportion joint products, individual average costs cannot be determined because common costs (raw materials, equipment, management expenses) cannot be allocated on any economically sound basis. Only separately identifiable costsβlike tanning costs for hides or refrigeration costs for beefβcan be allocated. Any allocation of common costs is wrong and illogical.
Joint Products Produced in Fixed Proportions
Products in fixed proportions should be treated as a package or bundle of output. All costs are common, and no rational cost allocation exists. Optimal output determination requires analyzing the relationship between marginal revenue and marginal cost for the combined output package. As long as the sum of marginal revenues from all by-products exceeds the marginal cost of production, the firm gains by expanding output.
Figure 2 illustrates the pricing problem. Demand and marginal revenue curves for each by-product and the single marginal cost curve for the combined output are shown. Vertical summation of MR curves gives total marginal revenue (MRT) because each unit provides revenues from both by-products. The intersection of MRT with MC identifies the profit-maximizing output level. Optimal price for each by-product is determined by the intersection of a vertical line at that output level with each by-product's demand curve.
Example: Cattle raising provides beef and hides in a 1:1 ratio. In the left panel of Figure 2, at Q = 40 units, PA = $12 and PB = $5 with both MRA and MRB positive. In the right panel, at Q = 60 units, MRB is negative. The firm produces 60 units of cattle, sells 60 units of beef at P'A = $10, but only 45 units of hides at P'B = $4.50 (where TRB is maximum and MRB = 0). The extra 15 units of hides are withheld from the market to avoid negative marginal revenue.
Joint Product Pricing Example
Joint Products without Excess By-Product A Paper Company produces newsprint and packaging materials in a fixed 1:1 ratio.
TC = $2,000,000 + $50Q + $0.01QΒ² MC = $50 + $0.02Q
Newsprint: Pa = $400 β $0.01Qa, MRa = $400 β $0.02Qa Packaging: Pb = $350 β $0.015Qb, MRb = $350 β $0.03Qb
Since Qa = Qb = Q: TR = $750Q β $0.025QΒ² MR = $750 β $0.05Q
Setting MR = MC: $750 β $0.05Q = $50 + $0.02Q 0.07Q = 700 Q = 10,000 units
At Q = 10,000: MRa = $200, MRb = $50, MC = $250 Prices: Pa = $300, Pb = $200 Profit: Ο = $1.5 million
Joint Production with Excess By-Product A recession causes demand for packaging materials to fall: Pb = $290 β $0.02Qb, MRb = $290 β $0.04Qb MR = $690 β $0.06Q
Setting MR = MC: $690 β $0.06Q = $50 + $0.02Q 0.08Q = 640 Q = 8,000 units
At Q = 8,000: MR = MC = $210, BUT MRb = β$30 (negative)
Since MRb is negative, the firm should not sell all units of product B. Optimal solution:
- MRa = MC: $400 β $0.02Q = $50 + $0.02Q β Qa = 8,750 units
- MRb = 0: $290 β $0.04Qb = $0 β Qb = 7,250 units
Prices: Pa = $312.50, Pb = $145 Profit: Ο = $582,500
β Key Takeaways
The most critical concepts from this lecture are the distinction between demand interrelations (substitutes vs. complements) and production interrelations (joint products in fixed vs. variable proportions), along with their respective optimal pricing rules. For products with interdependent demands, marginal revenue includes a cross-marginal revenue term that must be considered. For joint products in variable proportions, set MRA = MCA and MRB = MCB. For joint products in fixed proportions, set MRA + MRB = MCQ and use vertical summation of marginal revenues. When excess by-products exist with negative marginal revenue, withhold the excess from the market and sell only up to the point where MR = 0 for that by-product. Common costs cannot be rationally allocated to individual joint products.
π§ Quick Revision Questions
- What are the two components of marginal revenue for a multi-product firm, and how do they differ for substitute versus complementary products?
- What is the profit-maximizing rule for a firm producing joint products in fixed proportions, and how is total marginal revenue calculated?
- Why is the allocation of common costs to individual joint products considered wrong and illogical?
- In the Paper Company example with excess by-product, why did the firm produce 8,750 units of newsprint but only sell 7,250 units of packaging materials?
- How does the equal marginal revenue (EMR) principle apply to plant capacity utilization across multiple products?
π Lecture 35 β Pricing Practices (Continued 2)
π Overview: This lecture covers transfer pricing, which is the internal pricing strategy used when divisions of a vertically integrated firm trade intermediate products with each other. It explains how to set optimal transfer prices under three different market conditionsβno external market, perfectly competitive external markets, and imperfectly competitive external marketsβand also introduces markup pricing rules-of-thumb for profit maximization.
ποΈ Topics Covered
This lecture covers the meaning and nature of transfer pricing, effects of transfer prices, transfer pricing problems for products without external markets, with competitive external markets, and with imperfectly competitive external markets. It also covers pricing rules-of-thumb for competitive and imperfectly competitive markets, optimal price determination using elasticity, and markup pricing including optimal markup on cost and price, full-cost pricing, and the relationship between markup and demand elasticity.
π Lecture Summary
Transfer Pricing: Meaning and Nature of Transfer Pricing
Transfer Pricing is the pricing strategy in which a firm optimally sets the internal price at which an upstream division sells inputs to a downstream division. The transfer pricing problem arises from the difficulty of establishing profitable relationships among divisions of a single company when each separate business unit stands in vertical relation to the otherβwhere the output of one division is the input to another. Vertical integration occurs when a single company controls various links in the production chain from basic inputs to final output. To maximize profits for the vertically integrated firm, a profit margin or markup should only be charged at the final stage of production, and all intermediate products transferred internally must be transferred at marginal cost. Decentralization and the establishment of semiautonomous profit centers gave rise to the need for transfer pricingβdetermining the price of intermediate products sold by one semiautonomous division and purchased by another.
To simplify analysis, the lecture assumes the firm has two divisions: a production division (subscript p) that sells the intermediate product to the marketing division and possibly to outsiders, and a marketing division (subscript m) that purchases the intermediate product, completes production, and markets the final product. It is assumed that 1 unit of the intermediate product is required to produce each unit of the final product.
π Definition β Transfer Price: The internal price at which an upstream division sells inputs to a downstream division within the same firm.
π Definition β Intermediate Product: The product or service transferred between sub-units of an organization.
Effects of Transfer Prices: Transfer prices reallocate total company profits among business segments and influence decision making by purchasing, production, marketing, and investment managers.
Transfer Pricing Problem: Pricing transfer of products among divisions of a single firm can become complicated. The optimal transfer price depends on market conditions:
- Products without External Markets: Marginal cost is the appropriate transfer price.
- Products with Competitive External Markets: Market price is the optimal transfer price.
- Products with Imperfectly Competitive External Markets: Optimal transfer price is the marginal revenue derived from combined internal and external markets.
Transfer Pricing for Products Without External Markets
When transferred products cannot be sold in external markets, the marginal cost of the transferring division is the optimal transfer price. The production division can sell the intermediate product only internally to the marketing division, and the marketing division can purchase it only from the production division. Since 1 unit of the intermediate product is used to produce each unit of the final product, the output of both divisions is equal.
In Figure 1, MCβ and MCβ are the marginal cost curves of the production and marketing divisions, while MC is the vertical summation of MCβ and MCβ, representing the total marginal cost curve for the firm. The external demand curve for the final product is Dβ with corresponding marginal revenue curve MRβ. The firm's profit-maximizing level of output for the final product is 40 units, given by point Eβ where MRβ = MC, and Pβ = $14. Since 40 units of the intermediate product are required, the transfer price Pβ is set equal to MCβ at Qβ = 40, so Pβ = $6, given by point Eβ. The demand and marginal revenue curves faced by the production division are Dβ = MRβ = Pβ = MCβ = $6. Thus, the correct transfer price for an intermediate product with no external market is the marginal cost of production.
π Example: In Figure 1, the production division's MCβ = $6 at Qβ = 40. The marketing division demands 40 units of intermediate product to produce 40 units of final product. The transfer price is set at $6 (equal to marginal cost). The final product is sold at Pβ = $14.
Transfer Pricing with Perfectly Competitive External Markets
When transferred inputs can be sold in a perfectly competitive external market, the external market price represents the firm's opportunity cost. The optimal transfer price is the external market price. If upstream suppliers wish to supply more than downstream users desire to employ at a perfectly competitive price, excess input can be sold externally; if downstream users want more, excess demand can be met through external purchases.
In Figure 2, the marginal cost curve of the production division MC'β is lower than in Figure 1. The production division produces more intermediate product than the marketing division demands. With a perfectly competitive external market, the production division faces a horizontal demand curve Dβ at the given market price Pβ. The profit-maximizing level of output for the production division is 50 units, given by point E'β where Dβ = MRβ = Pβ = MC'β = $6. The marketing division can purchase the intermediate product either internally or externally at Pβ = $6. Its total marginal cost curve MCβ is the vertical sum of MCβ and Pβ. The best level of final product output for the marketing division is 40 units, given by point Eβ where MRβ = MCβ, and Pβ = $14. Thus, the production division sells 40 units internally and 10 units externally, all at Pβ = $6.
π Formula: MCβ = MCβ + Pβ (total marginal cost for marketing division when intermediate product is purchased at transfer price)
π Example (Algebraic): Demand: Qβ = 180 β 10Pβ or Pβ = 18 β 0.1Qβ, MRβ = 18 β 0.2Qβ. MC'β = 1 + 0.1Qβ, MCβ = 0.1Qβ. With competitive external price Pβ = $6: Production division: 1 + 0.1Qβ = 6 β Qβ = 50. Marketing division: MCβ = 0.1Qβ + 6 = 18 β 0.2Qβ β 0.3Qβ = 12 β Qβ = 40. Pβ = 18 β 0.1(40) = $14.
Transfer Pricing with Imperfectly Competitive External Markets
When transferred products can be sold in imperfectly competitive external markets, the optimal transfer price equates the marginal cost of the transferring division to the marginal revenue derived from the combined internal and external markets. The transfer price for intra-firm sales will differ from the price in the imperfectly competitive external market, becoming a case of third-degree price discrimination.
In Figure 3, Panel a shows the net marginal revenue of the marketing division as MRβ β MCβ. Panel b shows the demand curve Dβ and marginal revenue curve MRβ for the intermediate product in the imperfectly competitive external market. In Panel c, the MRβ curve is the horizontal summation of the net marginal revenue for internal sales (MRβ β MCβ) and external sales (MRβ). The best level of output for the production division is 40 units, given by point Eβ where MRβ = MCβ. The optimal distribution is 20 units internally to the marketing division and 20 units to the external market, so that MRβ β MCβ = MRβ = MRβ = MCβ = $4. The production division operates as a monopolist seller in segmented internal and external markets.
Pricing Rules-of-Thumb
Competitive Markets: Profit maximization requires setting MR = MC. In competitive markets, P = MR, so profit maximization requires P = MR = MC.
Imperfectly Competitive Markets: With imperfect competition, P > MR, so profit maximization requires MR = MC.
Optimal Price: Using the relationship MR = P[1 + (1/Ξ΅β)], setting MR = MC gives the optimal price formula: π Formula: Optimal P* = MC / [1 + (1/Ξ΅β)]
Markup Pricing and Profit Maximization
Profit maximization does not require calculating both MR and MC explicitly. Using information on marginal costs and the point price elasticity of demand, profit-maximizing prices can be calculated quickly. Many firms use markup pricingβsetting prices to cover direct costs plus a percentage markup for profit contribution. Flexible markup pricing that reflects differences in marginal costs and demand elasticities ensures MR = MC for each product line.
Optimal Markup on Cost: Uses cost as a basis. π Formula: Optimal markup on cost = -1 / (Ξ΅β + 1)
Optimal Markup on Price: Uses price as a basis. π Formula: Optimal markup on price = -1 / Ξ΅β
Markup or Full-Cost Pricing: Uses fully allocated average cost (C), which includes average variable cost at normal output plus allocated overhead. π Definition β Markup on Cost (m): (P β C) / C, so Price = P = C(1 + m)
Markup and Demand Elasticity: There is an inverse relationship between markup and demand elasticity. For example, if Ξ΅β = -2, then m = 100%; if Ξ΅β = -5, then m = 25%. More elastic demand means lower markup; less elastic demand means higher markup.
β Key Takeaways
The single most important concept in this lecture is that transfer pricing must align division incentives with overall firm profit maximization. For products without external markets, the transfer price must equal the marginal cost of the production division. For products with perfectly competitive external markets, the transfer price equals the external market price. For imperfectly competitive external markets, the transfer price is set where marginal cost equals the marginal revenue from combined markets, leading to price discrimination between internal and external sales. Finally, markup pricing based on demand elasticity is a practical method for achieving profit maximizationβthe more elastic the demand, the lower the markup.
π§ Quick Revision Questions
- What is the optimal transfer price when there is no external market for the intermediate product?
- How is the total marginal cost (MCβ) of the marketing division calculated when the intermediate product is purchased at the transfer price?
- In the perfectly competitive external market case, if the production division produces 50 units but the marketing division only demands 40 units, what happens to the remaining 10 units?
- What is the formula for the optimal markup on cost, and how does it relate to the price elasticity of demand?
- Under imperfectly competitive external markets, what condition determines the optimal distribution of the intermediate product between internal and external sales?
π Lecture 36 β Alternative Theories of the Firm
π Overview: This lecture critiques the neoclassical theory of the firm, which assumes profit maximization as the sole objective, and introduces alternative theories proposed during the 1960s. It examines both the Managerial School and Behavioral School, focusing on Baumol's Sales Revenue Maximization Model as a key alternative. Understanding these theories is crucial because they reflect real-world managerial behavior where ownership is separated from control.
ποΈ Topics Covered
The lecture begins with a critique of neoclassical profit maximization theory and its basic assumptions, followed by managerial criticisms regarding the separation of ownership and management. It then introduces alternative theories of the firm, including Baumol's Sales Maximization Model, Williamson's Managerial Utility Theory, Marris's Growth Maximization Theory, and Behavioral Theories by Simon, Cyert, and March. The lecture concludes with a detailed analysis of Baumol's Static Models, including the mathematics of sales versus profit maximization.
π Lecture Summary
A CRITIQUE OF THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
Traditional theory assumes profit maximization as the only objective of the business firm. Although this conventional theory still holds ground, several alternative theories were proposed during the early 1960s by economists including Simon, Baumol, Marris, Williamson, Cyret and March.
THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY
The traditional theory assumes a single owner-entrepreneur with no separation between ownership and management. The entrepreneur is assumed to have unlimited information, unlimited time, and unlimited ability to compare all possible alternatives and choose the one that maximizes profit. This behavior is described as acting with global rationality β there are no time, information, or other constraints in achieving the single goal of profit maximization.
The firm has a single goal of profit maximization and is an optimizing model attempting to achieve the best possible performance. However, there may be exceptions where making maximum short-term profit might cause entry of new firms or government intervention. The goal is attained by application of the marginalist principle assuming perfect certainty where cost and demand conditions are perfectly known.
"MANAGERIAL" CRITICISMS OF THE PROFIT-MAXIMISING MODEL
Berle and Means (1932) first commented that firms are owned by shareholders but controlled by managers, and owners' and managers' interests are different. Managers have discretion to use the firm's resources in their own interests. There is empirical evidence that profits are higher in owner-controlled firms than in firms where management is divorced from ownership, though the evidence is far from conclusive.
π Definition β Global Rationality: The assumption that the entrepreneur acts with unlimited information, time, and ability to compare all possible alternatives and choose the one that maximizes profit.
Two schools of thought emerged from the critique:
- The "Managerial School"
- The "Behavioural School"
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF THE FIRM
- Sales Revenue Maximization Model β William Baumol
- Theory of Managerial Utility β Oliver Williamson (integrates growth maximization, profit/sales maximization, and maximization of present value of future sales)
- Maximizing Growth β Robin Marris (managerial utility depends on the firm's rate of growth; supply-led growth vs. demand-led growth)
- Behavioral Theories β Herbert Simon, Richard Cyert, and James March (firms are multi-goal, multi-decision, organizational coalitions with imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality; managers cannot maximize but instead must satisfice)
The first three theories represent the Managerial School, while the last represents the Behavioural School.
π Definition β Satisficing: A decision-making strategy where managers aim for satisfactory rather than optimal outcomes because they cannot meet the aspiration levels of all stakeholders due to bounded rationality.
SALES MAXIMIZATION MODEL: W.J. BAUMOL
Baumol argues that sales maximization seems the most reasonable goal of managers, based on his experience as a consultant to large firms. He gives several reasons:
- Salaries and other earnings of top managers are correlated more closely with sales than with profits
- Banks and financial institutions are more willing to finance firms with large and growing sales
- Personnel problems are handled more satisfactorily when sales are growing
Top managers become risk-avoiders to a certain extent, which may curb economic growth but has a stabilizing effect on economic activity. In oligopolistic markets, management often acts on the basis that their decisions will produce no changes in competitors' behavior, except for major decisions like launching advertising campaigns or new product lines.
BAUMOL'S STATIC MODELS
The basic assumptions of the static models include:
- The time-horizon is a single period
- The firm attempts to maximize total sales revenue subject to a profit constraint
- The minimum profit constraint is exogenously determined by shareholders, banks, and financial institutions
- Cost curves are U-shaped and the demand curve is downward-sloping
A STATIC MODEL, WITHOUT ADVERTISING
Total sales revenue is at its maximum at the highest point of the TR curve, where price elasticity of demand is unity and marginal revenue equals zero (MR = 0).
In figure 1, profit (Ο = TR β TC) is maximized at $90 at Q = 40 units where MR = MC. TR is maximum at $250 where Q = 50, with MR = 0 and Ο = $70. If the minimum profit requirement is $70 or less, the profit constraint is non-binding. With a minimum profit requirement between $70 and $90, the profit constraint is binding or operative. If the minimum profit requirement were higher than $90, the firm produces Q = 40 units and maximizes Ο at $90 with TR = $240.
π Formula: MR = P[1 β 1/e] where e is price elasticity of demand β At maximum sales, MR = 0, so 0 = P[1 β 1/e], meaning e = 1 (unitary elasticity)
Predictions of Baumol's single-period model (without advertising):
- The sales maximizer will produce a higher level of output than a profit maximizer
- The sales maximizer sells at a price lower than the profit maximizer
- The sales maximizer earns lower profits than the profit maximizer
- The sales maximizer will never choose output where price elasticity (e) is less than unity
BAUMOL SALES MAXIMIZATION MODEL: EXAMPLE
Given: Demand function Q = 100 β 10P or P = 10 β 0.1Q TR = 10Q β 0.1QΒ² TC = 70 + 2Q Ο = -70 + 8Q β 0.1QΒ²
Profit Maximization: dΟ/dQ = 10 β 0.2Q = 0 β Q = 40, P = $6 TR = $240, Ο = $90
Sales Maximization: d(TR)/dQ = 10 β 0.2Q = 0 β Q = 50, P = $5 TR = $250, Ο = $80
With Minimum Profit Constraint of Ο = $85: -70 + 8Q β 0.1QΒ² = $85 0.1QΒ² - 8Q + 155 = 0 Using quadratic formula, selecting largest output: Q = 47.07 P = $5.29, TR = $249.14, Ο = $85 (minimum required)
π Example: A firm with demand P = 10 β 0.1Q and TC = 70 + 2Q produces Q = 40 and earns Ο = $90 under profit maximization, but produces Q = 50 (sales max) and earns only Ο = $80. If a minimum profit constraint of $85 exists, the firm produces Q = 47.07, charging P = $5.29 to achieve TR = $249.14.
β Key Takeaways
The neoclassical theory assumes a single owner-entrepreneur with global rationality pursuing profit maximization, but this has been criticized because modern firms separate ownership from management with different interests. Baumol's sales maximization model is the key alternative, where managers maximize total revenue subject to a minimum profit constraint determined by shareholders and financial institutions. A sales maximizer produces more output at a lower price than a profit maximizer and earns lower profits. The profit constraint can be non-binding (when minimum required profit is low enough) or binding (when it restricts the firm from reaching the sales-maximizing output). The sales-maximizing output occurs where MR = 0 and price elasticity equals unity (e = 1), and the firm will never operate where elasticity is less than one.
π§ Quick Revision Questions
- What are the three basic assumptions of the neoclassical theory of the firm?
- According to Berle and Means, how does the separation of ownership and management affect firm objectives?
- What is the difference between the Managerial School and the Behavioural School of thought?
- Under what condition is the profit constraint non-binding in Baumol's sales maximization model?
- Why will a sales-maximizing firm never produce at an output where price elasticity is less than unity?